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SYMPOSIUM

Why Can't We Do
What They Do?
National Health
Reform Abroad
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost

icy know that the U.S. is different. We do not have "socialized
ven Americans who have only a vague knowledge of health polmedicine," like our European or Canadian neighbors. We believe that health care is not rationed here, and that, unlike citizens of
other nations, we do not have to wait in long queues when we need
medical care. We believe that U.S. health care is the best in the world.
At the same time, the U.S. spends more on health care - both per
capita and as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) - than
other nations do. One in six non-elderly Americans has no health insurance, and voluminous studies show that lack of health insurance
has a dramatic effect on both access to care and on health status.' Furthermore, on many of the most important indicators of population
health, such as infant mortality and life expectancy, the U.S. scores
worse than do other nations.
How do we reconcile our beliefs with these facts? Why do other nations have universal health coverage while we do not? What, in fact,
do other nations do when it comes to health care? And bow do they
do it? Why can't - or don't or won't - we do what they do?
This article addresses these questions. It begins with an overview
of the public health insurance systems found in countries with economic and political systems similar to our own, exploring the structural and operational underpinnings of these systems and comparing
their cost and performance to that found in the U.S. It then considers the legal, political and social factors that account for the profound
differences between our system and the systems of other nations.

What Do Other Nations Do,
and How Do They Do It?
All other developed nations of the world, including developed countries in Western Europe, Asia, North and South America, and on the
Pacific Rim, provide health care for all or most of their residents. Although private health insurance products are available for purchase
on a voluntary basis in virtually every country, no other developed
country relies on private insurance as does the United State to provide primary coverage for its population. 2 All developed nations have
recognized that voluntary private insurance cannot cover everyone,
(as it does not in 3the U.S.) and have developed some form of public
health insurance.

Two Basic Models ofHealthInsurance
Two primary models can be found in the world: social insurance and
national health insurance. Each term refers to a specific approach to
the task of financing and organizing a nation's system for providing
personal health care. The first, and older, model is social insurance,
often called the Bismarck model after the German leader who established the first social health insurance system.4 The second, more
recent, is the national health insurance model, often called the Beveridge model after Lord Beveridge who proposed this approach for
the U.K. during World War I1.5
Chancellor Bismarck established the German social insurance system in 1883 in an attempt to turn back the tide of socialism that he
feared would engulf Germany.6 Under the German system as it has
developed, most citizens have an obligation to secure health insurance
coverage, which in turn is paid for, usually by a deduction from earnings, on the basis of the insured's income rather than the insured's risk
status or family size in order to ensure affordability. In Germany the
conceptual foundation of health insurance lies in a belief that members of a society have obligations to each other, a concept referred to
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incentives to provide the insured patient all
as "solidarity," rather than in the belief that
Why do oth(er nations have
individuals are responsible only for themneeded services.
universal healt:h coverage while
selves. This insurance obligation is effectuFor each component of the health care
ated through a system that collects the
we do not? VThat, in fact, do
sector (physician services, hospitals, pharrevenues needed to sustain health care. Emother nations(
etc) and in each region, budlo when it comes maceuticals,
ployers and employees each contribute a pergets in Germany are established globally
centage of wages to social insurance funds;
to health car e? And how do
within a framework of "premium stability:'
in turn, these funds provide health insurthey do it? Whiy can't - or don't This framework limits the rate of increase
ance for employees and their families. Most
in social insurance premiums to the rate of
or won't we d o what they do?
persons in Germany whose income falls
increase in inflation generally and tends to
below a certain level (46,350 Euros in 2004)
ensure that practice style and practice
must participate in this social health insurchoices evolve within a fundamental envi9
ance program. 7 Persons with incomes above this level are not required
ronment of overall health care spending control.' When necessary,
to participate, and many buy private insurance instead. However,
doctors are required to accept lower payments for what they do, in
about 60 percent of all of these upper income persons in fact particilieu ofthe insurers trying to directly control the manner in which docpate in the public system, because family coverage costs extra in the
tors choose to practice. But this strategy has resulted in increasingly
private system but not in the public, private insurance rates are riskacrimonious relations between providers and insurers, and Germany
adjusted while social insurance rates are not, and persons who opt out
is trying to find other ways of holding down costs, including managed
of the social insurance system may not in most instances ever return.8
care approaches that more directly affect practice style itself. 20
Social insurance funds in Germany are not administered by the
The social insurance model created in Germany has been adopted
government, but rather by non-profit organizations, which are acin much of the world. Other central European countries, including
countable to their members (and their members' employers). 9 There
Austria, Switzerland, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands have
are many of these funds, some tied to a particular employer, others
social insurance systems, as do many South American and Asian
occupation based, and still others locally-based.' 0 Thus employees of
countries for at least part oftheir workforce. 2 ' Many of the emerging
Mercedes or BMW would be insured through a company fund; farmdemocracies of Eastern Europe have also embraced the social insurers, miners or seamen are covered by special funds, and many peoance model. Part A of the U.S. Medicare program in most respects reple are insured through a general locally-based fund or through spesembles a social insurance system. Though these systems vary in
cial funds that used to only cover white collar workers." All social
many important respects, in each one health insurance is financed
insurance funds operate within a framework oflaws, and all cover esprimarily by payroll taxes or wage-based premiums, and services are
sentially the same services and charge similar (though not identical)
purchased from independent health care providers who often are in
premiums. 12 In order to ensure the stability of the health funds - and
private practice.
thus the effectuation of a truly nationwide system - health plans that
If the social insurance model was adopted by conservative govhave younger and less costly members must transfer money through
ernments to suppress the growth of socialism in the late 19th and
a risk-equalization scheme to the plans that have older and more exearly 20th century, the national health insurance model emerged
pensive patients, but the plans also compete with each other for
from the triumph of socialism in Europe after World War 11.22 The
members and thus have some incentive to keep their premiums
United Kingdom had adopted a limited social insurance system in
3
1911, but many people were excluded from it, and the U.K. emerged
down.'
from WWII determined to provide health care as a right to its entire
Health insurers have traditionally paid hospitals on the basis of
negotiated budgets, though Germany is moving toward payment
population.22 Access to health care would no longer depend on be4
on a diagnosis-related group (DRG) basis. Physicians and dentists
longing to a social insurance plan (which was usually, in some sense,
in Germany who furnish health care to plan members are organized
employment-related), but rather would be free at point-of-service to
into corporate bodies that resemble unions.15 In other words, while
all residents. Thus, universal coverage was created independent of the
physicians and dentists are private businessmen, they negotiate with
economic or employment status of any individual.
The English NHS is financed through general revenue taxation.
the health insurers collectively, much like an independent practice
These funds are administered by local units called primary care
association would do in the U.S. In recent years these corporate entities have negotiated with social insurers for a fixed budget, which
trusts. These units purchase services from NHS hospital trusts, which
they have allocated among their members on a fee-for-service basis.
are currently public corporations, as well as from general practitionThe method for allocating this budget among physicians is comers, who are private businessmen. 2 4 These services are then provided
plex and somewhat resembles in its formula the U.S. Medicare Reto the general public, in most instances without cost, although co-payments are imposed for some things like drugs, and a few services source Based Relative Value Scale, (RBRVS) which is a weighted
25
like most dental care - are provided mainly in the private sector.
fee-for-service payment scheme. Under the German system, each
doctor sends his or her claims to the physician's organization for the
The U.K., like many European countries, has a strong gatekeeper
region in which the doctor is located. Claims are coded for a certain
system. Every Briton has a general practitioner (GP), and a patient's
number of points for each service, with more complex services
first contact with the health care system is almost always with the
weighted for more points than simpler services. 16 The total physician
GP. 2 6 GPs still make house calls in the U.K., and the level of satisfacbudget for a geographic region is divided once each quarter by the
tion with primary care in the U.K. is very high.2 7 Specialist services,
total number of points billed that quarter, in order to reach a figure
including surgery, are only provided through hospitals and upon reknown as a point value. This conversion factor is then multiplied by
ferral from a GP.
the number of points billed by each doctor to figure out how much
Many nations have adopted the national health insurance model
that doctor has earned.' 7 While this is a simplified rendition of the
of public health insurance in the past half century, although, again,
payment formula, the bottom line is that under the German system,
in each nation the model looks somewhat different. 28 Canada, Ausphysicians work under a global budget that rewards those who work
tralia, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and some
harder while paying less to those who provide fewer services.' 8 The
Latin American and Asian countries have national health insurance
system realizes for the insurer the benefits of capitation for controlsystems. Other countries, particularly less developed countries, proling costs, but at the same time offers the provider fee-for-service
vide services through public hospitals and clinics without necessarily
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developing a full and comprehensive national system of health care
finance that would be essential to make such a network of services
accessible to all persons. Our own Medicaid program, as well as our
veterans', military, and Indian health services, resemble the "national
health insurance" model, in that all use general revenue funds to pay
for health services, but they are different in that their coverage is limited to certain narrowly delineated populations, which may even, as
with Medicaid, vary from state to state.
In virtually all countries, voluntary private health insurance ofthe
sort sold in the U.S. to both groups and individuals continues to exist,
although it serves different functions in different countries. In some,
such as Germany and the Netherlands, it covers wealthy people who
are not covered by social insurance.2 9 In others, such as Canada, it
covers services such as pharmaceuticals, which are not universally
covered by public insurance. In yet others, such as France, it covers
cost-sharing obligations, much like our own Medigap policies. In
still others, such as the U.K. or Australia, it allows privately insured
persons to jump the queue and get services faster or more conveniently than publicly insured patients.
Coverageand Benefits
Countries that have national health insurance programs cover all of
their citizens and long-term residents, although in most countries individuals can choose to carry private insurance and obtain services
privately.3 0 Some countries with social insurance funds, such as
France or Austria, cover their entire populations as well.31 Others,
however, such as Germany and the Netherlands, only require people
whose income falls below a certain level to be part of the social insurance program.3 2 Although people with higher incomes can choose
to be uninsured, few make this choice. 33 In Australia, government
subsidies are available that cover 30 percent of the cost of private insurance for hospital care, while tax penalties are imposed on higher
34
income persons who choose not to purchase private insurance.
This results in about 43 percent of the population being privately insured for hospital care. 35 In several of the southern European nations,
many people choose to purchase care privately, even though everyone
is covered by national health insurance, because they believe that
they
a
will get better care or more attention from their providers. 3
A number of countries apply means tests for determining coverage for certain services or for determining the applicability or level
of cost-sharing. The Irish health care system is partially means tested:
only low income holders of medical cards (about a third of the population) have free access to general practitioner services, and higher
income people without medical cards must pay a co-payment for
37
hospital and pharmacy services under some circumstances. In the
U.K. where long-term nursing home care is primarily regarded as a
social service, nursing homes are publicly funded only for those who
38
do not have the means to pay privately. Pharmaceutical coverage in
the U.K. is also means tested to the extent that the system waives required co-payments for low-income persons, although the government also waives co-payments for children, the elderly, and persons
39
with certain chronic conditions. No developed nation other than the
U.S., however, makes access to public health insurance depend totally
on economic "medical dependency" (Medicaid), or on age and disability status (Medicare). And no other developed country has nearly
as high a proportion of its population uninsured.
Social insurance and national health insurance programs vary
somewhat in the benefits they offer. The Canadian health insurance
program, for example, only requires the provinces to cover hospital,
physician, and surgical dental services, though most provinces also
cover pharmaceutical costs for at least some of their residents. Coverage in Australia is limited to hospital, physician, and pharmaceu4
tical care. ' Most countries do not cover nursing home care or cover
42
it as a social service rather than a health care service. In some counin
fact not generare
covered
nominally
tries some benefits that are
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ally available because of high cost-sharing obligations, limited coverage, or lack of provider participation.
DeliveringHealth CareIn OtherNations
Though public finance of health care services is quite common in
other countries, public provision of health care services is less universal. In most national health insurance countries, many health care
services are furnished by private entities and health professionals in
private practice. In few countries, for example, does the government
directly employ primary care physicians or dentists.4 3 Pharmaceuticals and medical devices are generally produced by private manufacturers and sold through private pharmacies or medical equipment suppliers. In most national health insurance countries public
hospitals are dominant, but in some private nonprofit or private hos44
hospitals are even more common in social
pitals also exist. Private
45
countries.
insurance
What Do We Get for Our Money Here,

and Why are Our Costs So Much Higher?
No other country spends as much on health care as does the U.S. As
shown on the accompanying table, social insurance countries generally spend more on health care than do countries with national health
insurance. The table, derived from a recent study of international
health care pricing, 4 6 illustrates the differences among nations in
health care spending as a percentage of GDP and in absolute dollar
expenditures. To be sure, some of these differences may be attributable to the fact that nations classify health spending differently; for
example, many government-borne costs of long term care, which are
classified as health expenditures in this nation, may be treated as social welfare spending in other nations. 47 But even when these differences of classification are taken into account, the U.S. spends more.
What does the U.S. get in return for its higher expenditures? Certainly not better health status. Life expectancy for males at birth is
Personal Health Care Spending: U.S. and Selected
Countries, 2000
Country

Health expenditures
as a percentage of GDP

U.K.
Germany
Sweden
Spain
Netherlands
France
Italy

Health care expenditures
in U.S. dollars
4,631
1,763
2,748
1,847
1,556
2,246
2,349
2,032

Source: G.E Anderson, et al. Health Affairs
75.7 in the U.K., 77.6 in Sweden, 75.6 in Germany, 75.8 in the Netherlands, but only 74.4 in the U.S. 48 Infant mortality rates stand at 5.5
deaths per one thousand live births in the U.K., and 3.7 and 4.3 respectivelyin
Sweden and Germany; the comparable figure for the U.S.
is 6 .8.4 9
Health status, of course, depends on diet, housing conditions and
societal inequality, and not just on health care. But it would also appear that far higher spending on health care in the U.S. fails to assure
residents better or more accessible health care. Indeed, by some measures we get less actual health care than do residents of other countries, although by other measures, we receive the same or slightly
more. During the year 2000, for example, the U.K. had 151 hospital
admissions per 1000 population, Germany had 205, and the U.S. had
only 118.50 The U.K. had .9 acute care hospital days per capita, Ger-
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and nearly four times that of the U.K. We also, of course, spend far
many, 1.9, the U.S. only .7.51 The U.K. had 5.4 physician visits per
more
on
the
administration
of
our
health
care system. 62 Our highly
capita, the Netherlands 5.9, and the U.S., 5.8.52 On average, the U.S.
fragmented health insurance system requires health care institutions
uses 30 percent more actual health care inputs per person (such as
and professionals to hire numerous personnel for billing who are
physician time or hospital days) than the U.K., while spending 75 perunnecessary in unitary systems. Private insurance also costs far more
cent more than the U.K. per person, while the U.S. uses 15 percent
than public insurance. Public systems do not spend the money spent
fewer inputs
than Germany, while spending 40 percent more per
5
by private insurance companies on marketing, underwriting, and
person. 3
Some countries that spend less on health care than we spend also
profit. The U.S. pays a very high price for maintaining a marketexplicitly ration access to services. In the U.K, for example, people
based health care system, and much of the money we spend does not
often have to wait to see a specialist, and then must wait again for
produce health care goods or services.
Another major difference can be seen in U.S. spending on health
surgery that the specialist may deem necessary. Waits are particularly
common for certain conditions such as varicose veins, hernias,
care technology. For example, in 2000, the U.S. maintained 8.1 MRI
cataracts, or painful joints - problems that have more to do with qualunits per million inhabitants, compared to 3.9 in the U.K. and 6.2 in
ity of life than with the preservation of life.54 Repeated efforts to
Germany.63 We had 13.6 CT scanners per million compared to 6.5 per
clear waiting lists have proven unsuccessful.
million in the U.K. and 8.2 per million in Canada; on the other hand,
In the U.S., health care access is also rationed, however, although
Germany had 17.1 per million. 64 Technology that would only be available in regional medical centers in some countries is available not only
not overtly and not for certain populations. Affluent and well insured
in community hospitals but in clinics and even physicians' offices in
persons have ready access to the most advanced and sophisticated
forms of health care, regardless ofwhether it is required or elective. But
the U.S. While this means that these technologies are immediately
available to Americans, it also means that they are used more often
those Americans who cannot afford to pay for health care and do not
have health insurance are effectively denied access to non-emergency
in the U.S. In 1999 U.S. physicians performed 388.1 coronary angioplasties per 100,000 population compared to 51 in the U.K. and
care. 55 Persons who have lower incomes and are publicly insured,
who are underinsured in relation to their financial circumstances (as
165.7 in Germany.65 Kidney dialysis rates were66 86.5 per 100,000
a result of high deductibles and cost sharing as well as limited covercompared to 27 in the U.K. and 64 in Germany.
age), or who are completely uninsured, may wait a long time for care
For all of our technology, however, there is little evidence that the
quality of care is better in the U.S.
or go without it completely.
than in other countries. A recent
Waiting lists are essentially a measure of the gap between need for care
If the social ins urance model was
study comparing the performance
as professionally determined and its
adopted by consen ative governments to of the U.S. health care system with
those of four other countries using
actual availability; that is, a person is
suppress the growth of socialism in the
nineteen process and outcome inon a waiting list only because a docdicators (such as cancer or transtor has determined that that person
late 19th and ear ly 20th century, the
plant survival rates or vaccination
needs care not yet available. One
national healthtinsurance model
study that attempted to quantify the
rates), found that the U.S. scored
gap between need for care and its
emerged from the triumph of socialism
best on three indicators, worst on
availability found that the effects of
in Europe aftier World War II.
two, and somewhere in the middle
67
the implicit limitations on health
on the others.
care access among uninsured perThere is also little evidence that
sons in the U.S. 5were
more severe than those imposed by the explicit
consumers in the U.S. are more satisfied with the quality of health
6
lists in the U.K.
care than are consumers of health care in other nations. A recent fivecountry survey of "sicker adults," for example, found that 44 percent
Even more important, perhaps, nations with national health systems whose spending levels approach those seen in the U.S., such as
of U.S. respondents were dissatisfied with their care, compared to 31
Germany or Switzerland, do not have serious problems with waiting
percent of U.K. respondents, and 36 percent of Canadians; while 23
57
lists. In other words, nations appear to be able to achieve near-unipercent of U.S. respondents believed that a mistake had been made
versal health coverage while spending less and without lengthy waits
in their medical care in the past 2 years, compared to 20 percent of
for necessary care.
Canadian and 13 percent of U.K. respondents. Fifty-eight percent
Waiting lists are not just a function of health care expenditures,
of U.S. respondents rated their doctors as excellent or very good on
moreover, but also of health system organization and the behavior of
diagnosing their medical problem, compared to 52 percent of Canadian and 57 percent of U.K. respondents; while 40 percent of U.S.
the health care sector. Waiting times in England vary dramatically
respondents reported difficulty in seeing a specialist when needed,
from procedure to procedure and tend to be worst for conditions that
compared to 53 percent of Canadian respondents and 38 percent of
are of little interest to doctors. 58 Perversely, hospitals there have some
incentive to maintain lengthy lists, because from time to time they are
U.K. respondents. 6 In a 2001 survey of citizens' views of access to and
quality of care, 57 percent of U.S., 53 percent of U.K. and 54 percent
offered financial incentives by government programs aimed at reof Canadian respondents rated overall medical care as excellent or
ducing waiting times. Similarly, many doctors have little incentive to
very good, while of respondents who had either themselves been hosreduce waiting times because patients who get tired of waiting can
pitalized or had a family member hospitalized in the past 2 years, 50
pay privately to have the same procedures done expeditiously by the
59
percent of U.S., 54 percent of Canadian, and 48 percent of U.K. resame doctors.
69
spondents rated care as excellent or very good.
Moreover, factors other than rationing are equally or more imporPerhaps
the
single
most
important
factor
underlying
lower overtant in explaining international differences in health care costs. One
all and per capita health care spending in countries with national
of the most important factors is that we simply pay higher prices for
health services is that most funds for health care flow through a sinhealth care services in the U.S. than do other countries. The average
gle, central budget. 70 The health budgets of nations with tax-financed
U.S. expenditure per hospital day in 1999 was $1859, three times the
national health services are visible and public and must compete
median for the developed countries that are members of the Organiwith other funding priorities, such as education or defense. Furtherzation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 60 The
more, it is hard to grow a publicly accountable health budget, because
average physician salary in the U.S. is nearly twice that of Germany,
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nowhere in the world is raising taxes popNo other coun t;ry spends as
Why Don't We Do It The Way
ular. Health services must learn to make
Do?
much on health care as does the Other Countries
do, therefore, on available funds,
countries can have universal or
If
other
United States of America.
In social insurance countries, funding
near universal coverage of their populadoes not flow through a central general budtions and spend less on health care than we
get, and is less well controlled; nonetheless
do, without obvious sacrifices in quality,
it is still subject to government oversight and is generally held in
why can't we do the same? Why does it seem to be our fate to have
71
check. As noted above, budgets for specific health sectors allow
the most expensive health care system in the world and still have over
reasonably tight control of expenditures.
43 million uninsured persons?
In the U.S., by contrast, funds flow from a multitude of sources,
Volumes have been written on the topic of American exceptionalsuch as general revenues appropriated by federal and state governism in health policy, and only the briefest survey of this literature is
ments, payroll taxes, premiums paid directly to thousands of indi8
possible here. 7 Explanations tend to focus on five factors, each of
vidual insurance plans by employers and employees (rather than into
which seems to play a role, though commentators disagree on their
a visible central fund) and extensive out-of-pocket payments by inrelative importance: U.S. political institutions; the U.S. social culture
dividuals and families. As a result, there is little chance for either
and character; a weak left and the limited strength of unions in the
discipline or control. Indeed, even in the case of the U.S. Medicare
U.S.; the political power of provider and insurer interest groups; and
program, which is financed in a unified fashion and centrally adthe strength of path dependency.
ministered, recent legislation adding prescription drug coverage
plans to Medicare creates the very type of private and decentralized
U.S. PoliticalInstitutions
purchasing scheme that characterizes health expenditures for the
First, the unusual character of American political institutions makes
non-Medicare population, and that makes budgeting and cost conradical innovation very difficult. A U.S. President is the leader of his
tainment so difficult to achieve.
party, but not necessarily of the government in the same sense as a
Other countries are also able to control their expenditures because
British prime minister is head of the government. It is possible in the
they have a more limited understanding of legal rights within their
U.S. for Presidents to confront Congresses of different parties, with
health care systems than we do. While it is true that U.S. employers
the result that efforts at reform get hopelessly mired in partisan polhave the option not to provide health plans to their workers, if they
itics. Even when one party controls the presidency and both Houses,
do, the laws that govern workplace benefits - in particular the Emas was the case during 1993 and 1994 when President Clinton's naployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) gives covered pertional health reform plan collapsed in spectacular failure, the mi72
nority may be large enough, and their ability to use the arcane rules
sons the legal power to enforce benefit rights in court. Medicare and
Medicaid, the nation's primary publicly financed health insurance
of debate strong enough, to defeat even a popular measure. The facprograms, both create legal entitlements. Ifbeneficiaries or recipients
tiousness of the majority can, of course, achieve the same result.
Most European nations have parliamentary governments, in which
court
and
demand
that
the
service
are denied services,
they
can
go
to
73
the executive and legislative branches are controlled by the same pobe supplied.
79
litical party or governing coalition. Party discipline is stronger than
The British, on the other hand, do not have individual entitle74
in the U.S., and when it really matters, party leadership can force
ments to health care. Rather, the NHS has an obligation to provide
80
health care services to the British public within the constraints of
back-benchers to tow the line. Of course, few countries have two
party governments, as we do in the U.S., and coalition governments
available resources. In recent cases the courts have asked local health
8
bring their own problems and complications, ' but in most European
authorities (which preceded the current primary care trusts as local
is
possible
for
ruling
parties
to
enact and implement
countries it
purchasers) to justify their decisions denying services, but the rehealth reform legislation. Thus, for example, Germany adopted major
sponsibility ofthe NHS is merely to act reasonably, not to provide any
s
7
health care reforms in 1988, 1992, 1997, and 1999, " while Britain
particular service to any particular patient."
made significant changes in its health care system during thes
Germans do have rights to particular services. These rights can be
83
Thatcher administration and again when Labor returned to power
enforced through a separate system of social courts whose jurisdiction
76
members.
their
By contrast, the governing institutions of the U.S. were in fact deextends to disputes between health insurers and
84
signed to block radical change. The current situation in which both
But the courts have become increasingly deferential to the coverage dehouses of Congress and the Presidency are controlled by the same pocisions of health insurers and their corporate representatives, seem77
litical party is a marked deviation from the norm of divided governingly realizing that resources are limited. Further, even if a social inment that has prevailed in the United States over the past half century.
surer has the obligation to provide a service, payment formulas and
Members of Congress are not, in general, dependent on the President
negotiated budgets act to limit total payments for provider claims.
for their jobs, and are relatively free to pursue their own course on
Thus the breadth of population coverage seen in other nations is to
s
health policy Senators often have their own power bases and shape
some extent offset by the fragility of the legal protections which are
reflect the ideology and the special interests oftheir own
their
policy
to
for
and
on
providers
of
services
conferred on beneficiaries for coverage
states. Most House members currently run unopposed or with token
payment for services. Access to care is universal, but not unlimited.
opposition, and are not dependent on the national party leadership for
Indeed, providing near universal access at a much lower cost is not
reelection. Party discipline is at best, therefore, uneven.
easy. In virtually every nation, providers claim that they are underMoreover, the rules ofthe Senate in particular militate against conpaid, and strikes for higher payments are not unknown. Hard bartrol by narrow majorities. Sixty votes are necessary to break a filigaining with providers is the norm. In some countries (though not in
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buster orto deviate from budget rules. Some level of consensus and
all), health care facilities are dingy and not always clean. The expanis
necessary,
therefore,
to adopt health reform legcross-party
support
sive hospital atriums and sparkling waiting rooms that we have come
islation. Perhaps most importantly, the presence of veto points
to expect are not standard in much of the world. But most other
throughout the American political process gives interest groups opcountries are able to muddle on, producing adequate (and often exposed to legislation extraordinary opportunities to block it or water
cellent) health care, making it available to all, and still holding the line
87
it down. The rough road traversed and close victory achieved by the
on cost. In the end, most other countries manage - unlike the U.S. recent Medicare Modernization Act, which had strong backing from
to provide universal and comprehensive coverage for health care that
the President and the leadership of Republican majorities in both
is more or less equivalent to the care offered here.
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Houses, attests to the difficulties ofmaking changes in the U.S. health
care systems. It is difficult to imagine the political stars that would
have to converge to bring about universal health coverage.
The federal system of the U.S. also militates against the adoption
of universal coverage. Though a number of countries that have universal health care systems are also federal states, social welfare programs tend to be weaker in such countries.8 8 Throughout the nineteenth century and into the 1930s, it was generally believed in the
United States that responsibility for social welfare resided in the
states, and that the U.S. federal government lacked the constitutional authority to enact universal health insurance.8 9 When the federal government enacted public assistance programs in the 1930s, it
acted through the states.90 The Medicaid program was built on this
model in the 1960s, and there still seems to be strong support for the
notion that providing health coverage through Medicaid-like state
programs.91 The preemption provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) - and fears of business out-migration - on the other hand, make it effectively impossible for states
that would like to adopt universal health coverage on their own to
move ahead by building on the established foundation of employment-based group coverage through the use of an employer mandate. 92 In addition, state constitutional restraints on taxation and
borrowing make it difficult for states to create public programs, and
renders them dependent upon the federal government, and its health
policy and programs, for leadership in extending coverage. 9 3 Liberal
states, on the one hand, have been blocked with moving forward
with health care reform, while regional conservatism (and indeed,
frankly, racism) has played a major role in the past
in blocking uni94
versal federal initiatives to address the problem.
The U.S. Social Culture and Character
Second, there is the cultural aversion of Americans to the use of government to solve problems, and in particular, to the creation of social welfare programs. We like to believe that private know-how and
entrepreneurialism can solve all problems, even ones such as health
care coverage lapses and excessively high spending levels, which so
obviously and consistently defeat the power of even the most creative
entrepreneur.
Indeed, it is far from obvious that the American people want their
government to adopt universal coverage, or at least that they want it
enough to push their lawmakers into doing something about it. European health care systems reflect a deeply rooted belief in the importance of social solidarity, a value that is widely shared across the
citizenry.95 Even though the welfare state lacks the support in Europe
that it enjoyed a generation ago, and most European countries have
experimented with harnessing market forces in health care delivery
and financing, there is still strong support for universal health care
and little support for turning health care coverage over to the caprice
96
of markets.
Americans are far more ambivalent about universal coverage.
Though a strong majority ofAmericans believe that legislation should
be passed to help the uninsured, consensus evaporates when specific
approaches to accomplishing this goal are discussed.9 7 There is considerably more support for solutions like expanding state Medicaid
programs or increasing employer coverage than for creating a new national health insurance, and a majority of those polled usually oppose
substantial tax increases to expand coverage. 98 Although the Clinton
plan seemed to enjoy strong popular support at the outset, this support evaporated once the public was convinced that it would result in
government control over health care, higher taxes, and health care
99
rationing.
It is also arguably true that Americans - particularly those who are
reasonably affluent, well insured, and able to get the ear of politicians
- do not mind spending more on health care than do other nations.
The French spend more on food than we do, the British more on hous-

ing. It appears that Americans simply have a taste for spending more
on health care.10 0 We are the richest nation on earth, and wealthy nations tend to spend a higher proportion of their national product on
health care than poorer nations. 0 1 We clearly are enamored by health
care technology,
and expect to have it available when and where we
02
want it.1
Nevertheless, the economic market for health care and political
market for health care policy are so distorted in the United States, that
it is difficult to believe that we have the mixture of cost and access that
most Americans would choose, given a choice. Indeed, the peculiar
nature of the political marketplace in the United States seems to explain much about the peculiar nature of our health policy.
A Weak Left andLimited Government
A third factor is the lack of a strong left wing in American politics,
(and the presence of a strong right wing) and also the weakened nature of the American labor movement. The lack of a powerful left wing
labor movement in the U.S. has been a particularly important factor
in explaining the American rejection of the welfare state.'0 3 Organized labor has never been as strong here as in Europe and has seen
04
a more precipitous decline in its membership in recent decades.'
But perhaps even more important, labor has not been the political
force in the U.S. that it has been in Europe. We have no labor party
or labor-based socialist parties., 5 Though labor unions are traditionally associated with the Democratic Party, they have not historically dominated that party. 0 6 Most importantly, organized labor has
focused traditionally more on private benefits for its members to be
gained through collective bargaining than on public welfare benefits
to be obtained through political action.'0 7 Indeed, Samuel Gompers
and his AFL played a major role in defeating national health insurance when it was first mooted in the second decade of the twentieth
century because
he preferred to retain union control over benefit
08
programs.'
The weakness ofthe left in the United States is matched, moreover,
with a powerful right wing. Right wing pressure groups like the
Christian Coalition played a major role in defeating the Clinton
plan.10 9 Public relations-savvy conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation have managed very successfully to keep the media
focused on their market-oriented proposals for health care system
organization, and distracted from exploring reform ideas that might
actually work here because they have worked elsewhere." 0
The Power ofSpecial Interest Groups
in Opposing Reform
Perhaps an even more important political factor in explaining our
peculiar American situation has been the role of special interests
that oppose universal health coverage in American politics."' As
Robert Evans has often pointed out, in health care as elsewhere in the
economy, one person's cost is another person's income or profit." 2 We
spend currently $1.6 trillion on health care, and millions of individuals have a massive investment in the continuation of the current
system." 3 On the other hand, American political campaigns are particularly expensive by international comparison. Special interest
groups contribute freely to American politicians, and expect that
their interests will be attended to."14 The recently adopted Medicare
bill, loaded with special interest provisions, especially its prohibition
against government "interference" with price negotiations between
drug benefit plans and pharmaceutical companies, is a classic example of the pork barrel character of American health care politics.
Doctors throughout the world have tended to oppose government
involvement in the health care system, at least initially."' Not surprisingly, the American Medical Association played a peculiarly important role in opposing the adoption of universal health insurance,
particularly in the middle of the twentieth century when it was at the
peak of its political power." 6 But provider interests have not been
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alone in this. Business and employer groups hcave also proved very
branches of the federal government are aggressively hostile to social
effective in opposing health care reform. Tho ugh the present emwelfare programs. 32 The tax cuts enacted since 2000, combined with
ployment-based system is burdensome to them it at least gives them
high military spending and subsidies for favored businesses, have recontrol over benefit costs and structures, and g,ives them a means of
sulted, apparently intentionally, in massive budget deficits that make
7
attracting workers." They also fear the higherrtaxes that would acany major new social initiative almost unthinkable. 33
company a government-run system. Busines s coalitions played a
But countries do change. One impressive fact when one reviews the
leading role, for example, in defeating the Clin ton plan." 8
history of universal health coverage throughout the world is how rePerhaps the most important impediment to universal coverage at
cently many countries have adopted it. Switzerland only established
the present time, however, is the commercial ins
surance and managed
a system of universal coverage in 1996 and Israel in 1995, while the
care lobby?' 9 Though private health insurance existed in both GerAustralian system dates only from 1984. The Spanish and Portuguese
many in the 1880s and Britain in the 1940s, it was in both instances
national health systems were created in 1986 and 1989 respectively.
generally offered by nonprofit fraternal and mut ual organizations that
One can, just barely, imagine a scenario in which a universal health
did not pose a significant political obstacle to thheenactment of a unicare system might become politically viable in the U.S. If, for examversal system.' 20 Countries that use a social in
isurance approach to
ple, our employer-based health insurance system continues to imcoverage, moreover, in general initially co-o pted existing private
plode, driven on by the risk-segmentation that will result if employhealth insurers by permitting them to operate tthe system. 21 By coners abandon relatively well subsidized defined-benefit health plans
trast, health insurance and managed care are important and influ(plans that provide employee with a defined set of benefits and relaential forces in the U.S., as they demonstrated ti rough the "Harry and
tively well articulated coverage standards ) in exchange for poorly
Louise" commercials. This series of commerci alsin the early 1990s
subsidized defined-contribution health plans (which offer employees
when the Clinton Health Plan was under debbate, which showed a
only a limited sum of money to procure coverage), the number of
clearly affluent couple expressing their concern, sover the dinner table
uninsured - and seriously underinsured - Americans will continue
22
about what the plan would do to them, helpe d kill it.1 Similarly,
to grow. At some point, a critical mass of the uninsured will consist
insurers' power in Congress guaranteed that
of politically active, middle class Americans,
the Medicare prescription drug legislation
who will demand a response from the govwould include, by the Administration's acAmericans who cannot afford ernment. At some point, moreover, doctors,
count, $46 billion dollars in subsidies over
and perhaps even drug companies will feel
to pay for health care and
the pinch as more and more Americans are
the next ten years to entice managed care
companies to participate in the Medicare
do not have health insurance
priced out of the market for their goods and
123
program.
are effectively denied access to services. Hospitals, moreover, will face an
increasing uncompensated care burden. At
PathDependency:
non-emergency care.
the same time, the political pendulum may
The Stickiness of What Is
sweep back toward the left, and a majority of
Americans may become more comfortable
Though each of these accounts of American
with a larger role for government in the American health care system.
exceptionalism has explanatory power,124 in theeend, one of the most
plausible explanations is the theory of path del sendency. This theory
Perhaps the opposition of business to national health insurance will
has been popularized in the health policy areaby Carolyn Tuohy in her
soften as employees become ever more dissatisfied with ever more
limited health coverage. Perhaps insurers may ultimately conclude
book, Accidental Logics, which recognizes that, in a sense, every country is exceptional. 25 The notion of path depen dency emphasizes the
that they are better off trying to find a role in a national health insurance system, perhaps as claims processors and fiscal intermedipower of inertia within political institutions. On ce nations get into the
habit of doing things in a particular way, they tend to keep on doing
aries, than to chance a fight to the death. Perhaps the day will come
when we do health care finance pretty much like other countries do
them that way.
it. We will never do it just like they do it, however, in part because
This is not a theory ofhistorical determinismc,however. From time
"they" do not do it in any one particular way. The British health care
to time "critical moments or junctures" appear7when a polity a consystem is different from the German system - which in turn are diffluence of factors in the broader political arena makes major instituferent from the Canadian or Irish systems. But that is the beauty of
tional changes in health care systems possible. 16 Thus the German
it. In the wealth of experience that the world has had with providing
social insurance system was created by a powerrful German chanceluniversal health insurance, there is a world ofideas for us to draw on
lor faced by a strong socialist challenge in the tumultuous time fol27
- in terms of broad models for carrying out universal coverage, in
lowing German unification in the late 19th centuury. The British Naterms oftechnical approaches to addressing technical problems, and
tional Health Service was established as the Labor Party, which,
in even in terms of political strategies for bringing universal coverreceiving a decisive political mandate following the end of World
age into existence. The ideas, the models, even the technology is
War II, turned its hand to rebuilding a devast :ated health care systhere. We only have to decide that we want it.
tem. 2s The Spanish and Portuguese national health services came
into being as those countries emerged from long-standing fascist
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